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A review of John 'ryler Bonner's Nature Vs. Nurture Revisited 
The Evolution of Culture in Animals 
(Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980) W hen biologists turn their attention to the relationships between mankind and animals, they see in mankind 
the quantitative extensions of qualities present in 
other species. Social scientists, on the other 
hand, see the uniqueness of mankind."2 Bonner 
is a biologist. And his book, The Evolution of 
Culture in Animals (ECA), is an attempt to 
demonstrate that culture, in mankind, is simply a 
quantitative extension of culture in animals. 
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Summary 
Chapter One, "Philosophy and Less 
Grand Matters," Bonner states both theI n purpose and principal conclusion of his book. The purpose is to "trace the origins 
of the human cultural capacity back into early bio-
logical evolution" (3, my emphasis). And, the 
principal conclusion is that "even though culture 
itself does not involve genetic inheritance or, 
therefore, Darwinian evolution by natural 
selection, the ability of any animal to have 
culture is' a direct product of such an evolu-
tionary mechanism" (3). 
In addition to the above, Bonner discusses the 
holism vs. reductionism debate in science. He 
sees the debate in its most pedestrian light: 
Reductionists in science attempt to understand 
"emergent"3 properties strictly in terms of their 
constituent parts. The holist, on the other hand, 
does not limit herself in this way. 
Bonner claims that "both [approaches to 
science] are important ... [that is] one cannot 
do without the other" (9). It is suggested that 
ECA offers an account of culture which will be 
acceptable to both parties in the debate. 
Finally, Bonner defines culture: "By Culture I 
mean the transfer of information by behavioral 
means, most particularly by the process of teaching 
and learning" (10). This definition, according to 
Bonner, emphasizes the method of transfer, not the 
kind of information that is transferred. And he 
calls the transfer of information, by way of this 
(behavioral) method, cultural evolution. 
In Chapter Two, "Cultural and Genetical 
Evolution," Bonner restates the purpose of his 
book in a slightly different way. He claims that 
the purpose of this book is to give an answer to 
the following question: Why do we, humans, have 
culture at all? 
Bonner claims that there are two possible 
approaches one might take in attempting to 
answer this question. The first approach is to 
examine those features of culture that are selec-
tively advantageous. The second possible 
approach is to examine the early evolutionary 
origins of culture. Bonner chooses to follow both 
paths, and the bulk of ECA is an interesting 
account of this journey. 
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Before beginning to trace his steps, though, 
Bonner offers the reader an account of the basic 
similarities and, more importantly, the basic dis-
tinctions between cultural and genetical evolution. 
While both forms of evolution transmit infor-
mation, genetical evolution transmits infor-
mation via the gene,4 while cultural evolution 
transmits information via beliefs, ideas, customs, 
etc., what Bonner calls a meme.5 
This nominal distinction does not, according 
to Bonner, reflect a difference in kind but simply 
a difference in degree, and it is suggested that 
cultural evolution, being a higher degree of evo-
lution, is better. Genetical evolution is con-
sidered to be a lower degree of evolution because 
of specific limitations. Genes limit an individual 
both in the speed in which it can transmit infor-
mation from itself to another individual and in 
the amount of individuals it can transfer infor-
mation to in its lifetime. Mter all, the transfer of 
information via genes requires reproduction. 
Cultural evolution, on the other hand, is not so 
restricted - a meme does not limit the transfer 
of information in either of these two ways. 
Memes can be transmitted by an individual to a 
very large number of individuals and this can 
occur very quickly. 
In Chapter Three, "The Brain and the 
Genome," Bonner begins his discussion of the 
early evolution of culture by tracing the steps of 
the progression of brains. The brain, he correctly 
claims, is a product of genes. Therefore, given 
that animals "higher on the evolutionary scale" 
have bigger brains than those animals with a 
lower standing, a bigger brain (most probably) is 
a product of natural selection. That is, "during 
the course of genetical evolution, selective 
pressure for the machinery must have produced 
the fast information processor of the nervous 
system. This ultimately led to a progressive cen-
tralization of the nervous system (still by natural 
selection of genes) leading to larger brains and 
finally to those capable of inventing culture" (33, 
my emphasis). 
Therefore, Bonner concludes, brain size6 is a 
direct outcome of evolution. After all, "this 
selective advantage of larger brains is evident in 
the evolution of vertebrates. There is a direct 
inverse correlation with the time of appearance 
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of a group in earth history and the size of its 
brain. At one end of the spectrum fish have small 
brains, while on the other end mammals have 
the largest" (45). 
Furthermore, according to Bonner, the 
increase in the size of the brain suggests "a trend 
toward increase in ability to learn, toward 
increase in flexibility of response" (45). And such 
flexibility is a necessary condition for the devel-
opment of culture. 
It is suggested, therefore, that if the increase 
in flexibility of response can be traced from 
humans back into the most primitive species, 
then two claims become plausible. The first claim 
is that only animals have the capacity for culture, 
the second, that culture (in animals) evolved. 
In Chapter Four, "The Early Origins of 
Cultural Evolution," Bonner offers an interesting 
and informative account of culture in animals. 
Given that animals, even animals as primitive as 
bacteria, can, unlike plants, move, and are 
therefore capable of behavior, Bonner claims 
that they are our cultural ancestors. 
Bonner attempts to make this claim plausible 
in the following way. He restates the distinction 
between cultural and genetical evolution. The 
distinction, he claims, "resides in a quick, flexible 
response for cultural evolution and a slow, pon-
derous response for genetical evolution ... " (56). 
Then, given the fact that the quickest response 
that an animal can take to its environment is a 
behavioral response, it is suggested that merely 
the ability to behave is a necessary condition for 
cultural evolution. Plants cannot evolve cul-
turally; only animals can. Bacteria, being motile, 
qualifY as animals. Therefore, bacteria qualifY as 
our cultural ancestors. 
But the kind of culture of which bacteria are 
capable is certainly a far cry from the kind of 
culture of which humans are capable. Bonner, of 
course, recognizes this. Therefore, Chapter Five, 
"The Evolution of Animal Societies," attempts to 
lend support to the claim that the characteristic 
of being social is a necessary condition for a 
more sophisticated notion of culture. But, 
certain properties indicative of human culture 
(e.g., the ability to communicate) is apparent in 
many animal societies (e.g., ants, wolves and 
humans), though at varying degrees. Thus, it is 
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plausible to claim that this characteristic has 
adaptive advantage. And if this is the case, then it 
is plausible to conclude that this social character-
istic (a necessary condition for culture) evolved. 
Bonner begins this chapter by defining an 
animal society as a "cohesive group of intercom-
municating individuals of the same species" (76). 
And it is this communicating characteristic, 
shared by all of the individuals in the group, 
which is the essence of the society. Therefore, 
given that culture is defined as "the transfer of 
information by behavioral means, most particu-
larly by the process of teaching and learning ... " 
(76), along with the above definition of a society, 
then if it can be demonstrated that the character-
istic of being social is a product of evolution, 
then it would be plausible that culture, which is 
"simply not possible without communication" 
(113), is also a product of evolution. 
Given that Bonner has demonstrated that 
social behavior (e.g., cooperative behavior) is 
(most likely) a consequence of natural selection, 
Bonner suggests that he has offered evidence for 
at least the plausibility of the thesis that the 
ability for culture itself is a consequence of 
natural selection. i 
In Chapter Six, "Learning and Teaching," 
Bonner discusses that aspect of communication 
behavior that he claims is the hallmark of a 
sophisticated) culture, namely, teaching and 
learning. Bonner traces the evolution of both. 
The evolution of learning (from the most 
primitive "learners" to the most advanced) is the 
following: (I) Organisms that can respond to the 
environment, but only in a "fixed" way, e.g., "the 
shooting out of the proboscis of a fly in the 
presence of sugar water" (134). (2) Organisms 
which respond to the environment in a way that 
is limited but not fixed, e.g., "a fly moving toward 
or away from light" (I35). (3) Organisms which 
can demonstrate a "slight flexibility in the 
response by being continuous over a range of 
related but quantitatively varied stimulus ... a 
good example would be the honey bee's 
response to signals indicating different degrees 
of distance or direction" (135). (4) Organisms 
which can only respond (correctly) to the envi-
ronment by learning the correct response "rather 
than [by giving] an automatic, innate fixed 
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response" (135). An example of this kind of 
response is apparent in the development of dif-
ferent (song) "dialects" within the same species 
of song-bird. 
The evolution of teaching (from the most 
primitive "teacher" to the most advanced) is the 
following: (1) Organisms which can produce 
only a single signal, directed toward one indi-
vidual. (2) Organisms which can produce more 
than one signal. (3) Organisms which can 
produce a "great proliferation of these signals 
that become increasingly loaded wi th infor-
mation" (135). (4) Organisms which can put 
their signals into artifacts such as writing. 
In Chapter Seven, "The Evolution of Flexible 
Response," Bonner attempts to demonstrate 
that "culture and its transmission is the ultimate 
in flexible behavior" (137), in order to help 
defend his original thesis, that culture is (indi-
rectly) a product of natural selection. Toward 
this end, Bonner demonstrates that flexible 
response itself, evident in all animals, particu-
larly mammals, and most particularly in 
humans, evolved. 
It is interesting to note that Bonner concen-
trates his discussion on those flexible responses 
surrounding mating and offspring-rearing 
behaviors. In a discussion of the numerous 
"strategies" which animals in fact use to achieve 
the desired result of a new generation, Bonner 
stresses the point that within the same species 
there often are alternative (and even contra-
dictory, e.g., monogamy and polygamy) strategies 
for successful mating and rearing. He calls these 
(successful) alternative strategies "evolutionary 
stable strategies" (160). 
Whether these strategies are determined by 
gene or meme, at this point, is irrelevant. The 
conclusion which Bonner suggests is that, at least 
from the point of view of survival value,R an} 
(actual or possible) strategy, if evolu tionarily 
stable, is as good as any other. 
This, of course, holds for human evolutionary 
stable strategies as well. Therefore, for example, 
as long as children are born9 and raised, it is 
irrelevant whether they are born or raised by 
men or women or some combination of the two. 
The last chapter, Chapter Eight, "The 
Evolution of Culture," traces the evolutionary 
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progression of culture (i.e., its degree of com-
plexity) by tracing the evolutionary progression 
of animals, specifically the development of their 
brains. (Also, a conclusion to the book is given at 
the end of this chapter.) 
Instead of asking 
whether a particular 
behavior is a product 
of genes or environ-
ment, one can ask a 
similar question about 
human behavior as a 
whole ••.• Given that 
there is such an 
rJenormous increase" 
in the amount and 
complexity of culture 
(between humans and 
other animals), does 
this difference in 
degree iustify one in 
believing that there is 
a difference in kind? 
In this chapter Bonner concentrates the dis-
cussion of evolutionary progression on that 
portion of the "evolutionary chain" that is non-
human. Bonner offers many examples of culture 
in nonhumans in order to establish that culture, 
like the animals in which it is present, has pro-
gressed. He offers examples of culture in the 
very primitive culture in bacteria, progressing 
through the less primitive culture in insects and 
reptiles, up to the even less primitive culture in 
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primates, to the advanced culture of Homo 
sapiens, finally culminating in our modern (lit-
erate) culture. 
Bonner's main point here is that the parallel 
between the evolution of animals and the evo-
lution of culture suggests that if the former is 
progressive,IO the latter must be so as well. 
Therefore, culture is (most likely) a product of 
natural selection. 
Parenthetically, Bonner recognizes that 
although the progression of culture in bacterial 
"societies" to the culture in, for example, primate 
societies is impressive, the progression of culture 
in primate societies to the culture in human soci-
eties is much more so. "In an evolutionary pro-
gression, if one passes from primates to man, the 
amount and complexity of the culture increases 
enormously" (185). 
Bonner concludes the book with the following 
disclaimer: "In the case of man ... it is especially 
difficult to demonstrate what components of 
behavior have a direct genetic basis" (195). But, 
it is suggested that this difficulty concerning a 
particular behavior does not affect his claims 
concerning behavior in general. Consequently, 
he claims that instead of asking whether a given 
behavior X has a direct genetic basis, the most 
"rewarding" question which we could ask about 
culture is, "Why did this mode of transmission 
[by memes] arise in the first place during the 
long course of evolu tion" (196)? 
Bonner's answer to this question is "that 
culture as a process is by itself of enormous 
adaptive value" (196). Therefore, an animal with 
the ability for culture (the ability to adapt to situ-
ations with enormous flexibility), i.e., a big brain, 
would have selective advantage. Therefore, 
"culture lies in the genetical evolution of animals 
and man" (198). 
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The Argument 
B om~er': ar~ument in SUPP~)rt of the above claim IS bIfurcate. The fIrst part of the argument is used to establish the fact that 
bigger brains (brains that are large relative to 
the animals' body weight) are, from the point of 
view of evolution, better brains. The argument is 
the following: (I) [P]resumably all the major 
physical features of our brain are genetically 
determined" (25). (2) Brain size is a major 
physical feature, and "the selective advantage of 
larger brains is evident" (45). C'I) Therefore, 
larger brain size is the proper product of pro-
genitive progress. 
The second part of the argument attempts to 
establish the fact that an animal's having a large 
brain is, at least, a necessary condition for that 
animal's having the capaci'ty for culture. The 
argument is as follows: (I) In order to have the 
capacity for culture the animal must have the 
capacity to communicate with members of its 
own species (113, paraphrase). (2) In order to 
communicate, animals must be able to transfer 
certain kinds of information quickly and easily. 
(3) This ability requires that the animal have a 
large brain. Therefore, (4) Having a large brain 
is, at least, a necessary condition for havina the
'" ability for culture. 
In the light of the above arguments, Bonner's 
claim that the ability for culture is genetically 
determined is true but trivial. And it is trivial in 
two senses. It is logically trivial: If having a large 
brain is, at least, a necessarv condition for 
having the ability for culture al~d if larger brain 
size is a product of genetics, then it simply 
follows that the ability for rulture is a direct 
product of evolution. 
But, more importantly, this claim is concep-
tually trivial; that is, it is uncontentious. Who 
would doubt that the ability for culture in 
animals was a product of natural selection? Or, 
who would debate the fact that culture is "indi-
rectly" a product of natural selection? After all, 
what other choice is there, God? 
The important point is that anyone who 
accepts the theory of evolution as the correct 
explanation for why humans (or any other 
animals) exist at all believes that ali of our 
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physical charac teristics (and, the refore, the 
physical characteristic of a big brain) were (at 
least) not unrondurive to our survival. 
Therefore, given that the ability for culture is 
ultimately grounded in the physical character-
istic of a big brain, it is a trivial claim to state 
that the ability for culture is (most likely) a 
product of natural selection. I cannot imagine 
that anyone (except maybe a "Creationist"), let 
alone any sociologist, would find this very weak 
claim to be at all contentious. 
The debate between the sociobiologist and 
the sociologist revolves around the question of 
whether or not our (human) partiru!ar social 
activities (e.g., monogamy) are a product of 
"nature" or "nurture." Bonner avoids making a 
claim, either way, on this point. But he does not 
avoid the issue altogether. Instead of taking a 
stand, Bonner offers a reason why he has 
avoided this issue; namely, regardless of which 
side of the issue one stands on such a determi-
nation is "'in tractable" (188). 
But the debate can still be waged on a a more 
general level. Instead of asking whether a par-
ticular behavior is a product of genes or envi-
ronment, one can ask a similar question about 
human behavior as a whole. The debate between 
the sociobiologist and the sociologist would then 
center around the following kind of question: 
Given that there is such an "enormous 
increase"ll in the amount and complexity of 
culture (between humans and other animals), 
does this difference in degree justify one in 
believing that there is a difference in kind? 
Bonner simply avoids this kind of question. 
Furthermore, Bonner even avoids the weaker, 
heuristic question: Does this difference in 
degree (whether indicative of a difference in 
kind or not) justify one in treating the dis-
cussion of culture in humans differently, that is, 
as if there was a difference in kind? It is this 
latter kind of question which makes for inter-
esting discussion. Bonner (in ECA) has simply 
avoided the interesting. 
Further Remarks 
light of the above I think that it is 
important to try to understand why (andI n for whom) Bonner would have written ECA. For Bonner himself recognizes that 
the thesis that "the capacity for c~dture 
undoubtedly has a genetic basis ... [is a thesis 
with] which everyone agrees .. , [for] this could 
be no more than saying that the genes determine 
the structure of the brain" (29). 
In attempting to offer an answer to the 
question, 'Why has culture come into being?,' 
Bonner offers such a weak answer in order to 
demonstrate that one can stand on neutral 
ground concerning the debate between the 
sociobiologist and the sociologist. In so doing 
he attempts to convince proponents from both 
sides of the issue to erase the "battle lines" 
(187) between biology and the social sciences. 
Bonner believes that "it is important for the 
biologist, and more particularly the sociobiol-
ogist, to realize that his recent flashes of insight 
that have come, for instance, through the aegis 
of kin selection, will not solve all the problems 
of the social sciences, but may shed some bright 
light on aspects of human social behavior. The 
social scientist, on the other hand, must face 
the possibility of some biological information 
being extraordinarily useful to him, and cer-
tainly it should not be rejected for doctrinaire 
reasons" (187). 
But although Bonner may be correct that a 
spirit of comradery between the scientists 
involved in these two camps is necessary, it 
does not follow from this that there should be 
a breakdown of all distinctions between the 
two disciplines. After all, the questions 
(answers) of one discipline may not be rel-
evant l2 to the questions (and answers) of the 
other. At least, such relevance has not been 
demonstrated by Bonner. 
Furthermore, Bonner simply assumes that a 
proper answer to the question, "Is culture, as a 
means of non-genetic transmission of infor-
mation, adaptive" (188)?, requires an in terdis-
ciplinary approach. And this point, though not 
debated in ECA, is certainly debatableYl 
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Therefore, although Bonner may be right that 
the only intolerable position concerning the 
nature vs. nurture issue is that of either extreme 
-"that all or no cultural phenomena have a 
direct genetic involvement" (32) - this point 
has not been demonstrated. 
ECA offers the reader an interesting journey 
through the development of culture in animals. 
But although there is much here that may be of 
in terest to the biologist, there is Ii ttle here of 
philosophical or political value. Most impor-
tantly, there is nothing in ECA which the sociol-
ogist need worry about. Even if everything that 
Bonner suggests is true, none of these facts 
speaks to the real question: Is human culture a 
product of nature or nurture? 
I All textual page references are to this work. 
2 R. Haven Wiley, 'The Capacity for Culture," 
Science,]uly 1980. 
3 Bonner claims to use the term "emergent" in 
the "straightforward" sense. That is, an emergent 
property is any new property, either structural or 
behavioral, which did not exist "at a lower level 
of complexity." (p. 186) 
4 This is the standard accoun t of genes. 
Information is encoded in the molecular 
structure of cens (DNA) and is then passed on 
from one generation to another. 
5 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 1976. 
6 That is, brain size relative to body size. 
7 In the last chapter of the book, specifically p. 
193, Bonner makes this claim more clear when 
he states that "the system of communication itself 
has spawned the possibility of a new method of 
transmission [of information] bypassing the 
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genes. This means that in order to win in the 
struggle for reproductive success it might be 
advantageous to transmit information directly 
from one individual to another rather than 
through the genome. Therefore any cooperative 
or selfish act that is adaptive and that could be 
achieved by quick signal transmission would be 
favored over any slower genetic transmission. 
This bypassing was so successful that the selective 
process in the genes was no longer for more elab-
orate genetic signals, but for bigger brains that 
could transmit a wide variety of rapid, flexible, 
innovative signals in a behavioral, rather than in 
a genetic fashion. This step is the cornerstone of 
the evolution of culture; and there is every 
reason to believe it occurred as the consequence 
of natural selection." 
K Survival value is the only "value" which 
Bonner acknowledges. 
9 Of course one can imagine an external (arti-
ficial) womb or a "natural" womb implanted in a 
male. 
IOVery few would doubt that humans are the 
most evolutionarily advanced species. 
IlThis great increase in the amount and com-
plexity of culture from primates to man 
(indicative in man's ability to teach and learn via 
language) is recognized by Bonner, p. 185. My 
point (below) is that Bonner does not take a stand 
as to whether this enormous difference in degree 
justifies us in believing (or not) that there is a 
difference in kind. 
12By relevant I mean that the sociological 
information must provide good reason for 
accepting or rejecting a particular sociobio-
logical claim, or vice versa. That is, the findings 
of sociology (or sociobiology) are only relevant 
to the findings of socio biology (or sociology 
respectively) if they give us good reasons for 
believing that the claims made by the latter are 
true. 
13Actually, I think that the question of whether 
sociobiology (or sociology) is relevant (in the rel-
evant way to sociology or sociobiology respec-
tively) is a philosophical question! 
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